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Abstract 
This research analyses airlines’ pricing decisions in response to changes in the market 
conditions. We estimate the effects of jet fuel price changes on European airfares at 
airline/route level by discriminating on the grounds of supplied capacity and markets’ 
competitive structure. Our results show that airlines tend to adjust fares asymmetrically 
following a “rocket and feather” behaviour. The asymmetric pricing is marked in periods of 
decreasing capacity when the increases of fuel price are passed at a higher degree than fuel 
cost savings. In contrast, when capacity increases the asymmetry is lowered. Moreover, we 
show that highly competitive markets are characterized by a lower price asymmetry 
compared to low competition markets. Finally, our results show that airline price asymmetry 
reaches its maximum when capacity is reduced and competition is low.  
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Highlights: 
 The paper analyses airlines’ pricing decisions in response to fuel price changes. 
 Airlines adjust fares asymmetrically according to a “rocket and feather” behaviour. 
 Prices are adjusted faster in case of increasing fuel prices. 
 The higher the competition the lower the positive asymmetry. 
 Combinations of capacity change and market competition affect the asymmetry level. 
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1 Introduction 
A relevant topic in the airline industry is whether airlines succeed in passing through cost 
changes to their fares. It is relevant for airlines, whose volatility in cost levels (especially in 
fuel cost) is a source of significant risk (Borenstein, 2011b). It is extremely important for 
regulators, whose policy interventions’ effects depend to what extent charges are born by 
airlines rather than by passengers paying higher fares (Koopmans and Lieshout, 2016). It is 
attention grabbing for popular press, especially during periods in which consumers complain 
about raising airfares despite plunging oil prices (The Guardian, 2015, The Wall Street 
Journal, 2015). Finally, it is vital for antitrust authorities, which constantly monitor competition 
levels in the airline industry, especially after the recent period of major carriers’ consolidation 
(The Economist, 2015). Recently, concerns about possible uncompetitive dynamics in the 
industry have gained ground among consumers and policy makers as demonstrated by the 
remarks of US senator Charles E. Schumer who declared: “the industry often raises prices in 
a flash when oil prices spike, yet they appear not to be adjusting for the historic decline in 
the cost of fuel; ticket prices should not shoot up like a rocket and come down like a feather” 
(The New York Times, 2015). This recalls to Bacon (1991) who termed “rocket and feathers” 
the pattern of asymmetric price adjustments of retail gasoline prices to cost changes. 
Despite such relevance, the empirical evidence on airline price asymmetries in response to 
cost changes is limited and mainly focused on US data. The aim of this paper is to shed light 
on carriers’ response to input price changes in the European airline industry. The focus is on 
fuel prices that, together with labour costs, are the major factors driving the changes in 
airlines’ input prices (Scotti and Volta, 2017). Specifically, the importance of fuel price is 
mainly due to its volatility: while the trend of labour costs is typically increasing on the long 
period (Dennis, 2007), the impact of volatile fuel price is less predictable playing a 
determinant role in airline’ short terms input price change (Franke and John, 2011). This is 
demonstrated by the fact that airlines hedge a portion of their fuel needs to reduce the 
swings in profits (Morrell and Swan, 2006). As a further confirmation of the key role of fuel 
costs, the US Department of Justice began an investigation in June 2015 on major US 
carriers accused to have saved billions of dollars on fuel without passing these savings to 
the passengers (The Washington Post, 2015).  
Economic theory on pricing behaviour tells that, in a context of profit maximizing firms, a 
general rule is that firms will charge a relative mark-up on marginal costs. Such mark-up 
depends on the elasticity of the demand that in turn is affected by the demand shape and 
the market structure. When firms face a change in their costs the way in which it is passed-
through to consumers depends on the type of cost (firm specific or industry-wide), and on 
the firm market power. When analysing the airline industry, many papers refer to the airlines 
industry as highly competitive, hence considering a symmetric pass-through rate of 100%.1 
Few other contributions (e.g. Forsyth and Gillen, 2007; Forsyth, 2008 and Oxera, 2003) 
consider the aviation markets as oligopolies assuming a significantly lower rate. A 
comprehensive review on the topic is provided in Koopmans and Lieshout (2016), who 
discuss the expected behaviour of airlines according to market characteristics. The authors 
consider market routes as differentiated oligopolies where airlines compete choosing their 
flight schedules first (as firms choosing their quantities in a Cournot model) and then 
adapting their fares to the demand levels. The authors conclude that empirical studies on 
airline pass-through rate are however limited mainly due to lack of detailed ticket fare data. 
Among these few empirical analyses we mention Wadud (2015) and Cannon and Watanabe 
(2016). Wadud (2015) analyses US time series data finding evidence of asymmetry in the 
                                               
1
 Anger and Kohler, 2010; Boon et al., 2007; Lowe et al., 2007; Mayor and Tol, 2010; Mendes and 
Santos, 2008; Morrell, 2007; Scheelhaase et al., 2010; Scheelhaase and Grimme, 2007. 
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pass-through rate. According to his results, increases in fares are quicker when fuel price 
increases and slower when the fuel price decreases. Cannon and Watanabe (2016) analyse 
US air transport industry finding evidence of asymmetric pricing in periods of contracting 
demand, with airlines bearing fuel cost increases while passing through fuel cost savings. 
Despite the important contributions, the abovementioned researches exhibit the not 
negligible limitation of using data aggregated at carrier or industry level hence not capturing 
the market (i.e. routes) heterogeneity in terms of market characteristics.2 By using route level 
data, our aim is to fill this gap by estimating and analysing airlines pricing behaviours in 
different market conditions. 
2 The Issues 
It is widely acknowledged that airline managers adjust ticket fares on the basis of fuel price 
(Brueckner and Zhang, 2010; Borenstein and Rose, 2014). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that airlines are rather reluctant to pass the cost reductions as equally as they pass cost 
increases (The Telegraph, 2016). In the economic literature, this kind of asymmetry is also 
termed “positive” and describes a situation in which firms react more and/or quicker when 
inputs' prices increase than when decreasing (i.e. positive asymmetry is not desirable from a 
consumer perspective). Oppositely, when firms react more and/or quicker after inputs’ prices 
decreases, the asymmetry is defined as “negative”. Studies on asymmetric price 
transmission in various industries have found evidence for rockets-and-feathers behavior 
(see for example Peltzman, 2000). Generally, the main proposed causes of asymmetric 
pricing are found to be the exercise of market power and/or industry-specific factors 
(Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008). Many authors have suggested that market power 
generally leads to positive asymmetric price transmission (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004). In this regard, European airline industry with few airlines serving OD connections (i.e. 
a close approximation of an oligopolistic market) may be a perfect breeding ground for it. 
However, Bailey and Brorsen (1989) and Ward (1982) show that also negative asymmetry 
may be associated with market power and, therefore, it is not possible to ascertain its type a 
priori.3 Some recent research seems to support the general idea of asymmetric price 
adjustments in the airline industry: Wadud (2015) finds positive asymmetry; Cannon and 
Watanabe (2016) negative asymmetry. In a paper on asymmetric pricing in the gasoline 
market, Borenstein et al. (1997) provide three further explanations for price asymmetries: (i) 
tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring, (ii) finite inventories and (iii) consumer search cost. 
Similarly, Hong and Lee (2014), investigating retail gasoline market, point out that the main 
causes of positive asymmetry are consumer search cost and tacit collusion. More 
specifically, the authors show how tacit collusion facilitates the link between market power 
and asymmetric pricing. This relation may be of interest in the airline industry. On the 
contrary, consumer search costs seem to be negligible given the existence of online travel 
search engines. Finally, the issue of finite inventories drives the attention on airlines’ 
capacity. In this regard, Noel (2008) underlines that capacity constraints reduce the 
incentives to undercut prices (strategy on which is based a further potential explanation of 
asymmetry, i.e. Edgeworth price cycles, that therefore we do not consider). Summarizing, 
we consider market power, capacity and their interaction as possible sources of asymmetry 
in airline’s pricing.  
When analyzing airline industry the asymmetric pricing evidence is still limited. Accordingly, 
our first hypothesis examines whether such asymmetry exists in Europe: 
                                               
2
 According to Button et al. (2011) competitive pressure, combined to periodic short-term shocks, may 
even compromise the ability of airlines to recover their costs. 
3
 Bailey and Brorsen (1989) and Ward (1982) analyse agricultural industries. 
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H1 - European airfares are adjusted asymmetrically and the asymmetry is positive. 
In the case our hypothesis H1 is corroborated, our interest moves towards the study of the 
factors potentially influencing such behavior. More specifically, we study whether airlines are 
generally simply reluctant to pass on fuel savings, or whether they adopt different conducts 
on the basis of non-pricing strategic choices and of specific market conditions. Concerning 
airlines’ strategies, the existing literature suggests that airlines can justify shifts in the selling 
price by changing capacity (Cannon and Watanabe, 2016). Indeed, according to airline 
managers, industry capacity is the dominant factor in determining airfares (Hazel, 2018). If 
setting capacity is seen as a mere instrument to anticipate demand, we may expect that 
airfares are influenced but not the pass-through rate of fuel cost (i.e. after controlling for the 
effect of capacity change on airfares change). However, airlines’ discretion in setting 
capacity levels may have a whole other meaning in the light of the recent debate on the so-
called “capacity discipline”. Keeping capacity low compared to historical levels is a strategy 
initially embraced by airlines to respond to the global economic downturn and high and 
volatile fuel prices. This strategy has been then maintained in presence of economic 
recovery and more stable fuel prices (Wittman and Swelbar, 2014). Such a trend has been 
observed at a global level and recently defined by CAPA (2013) as a “new global religion” 
leading to improved airline profitability. The idea that limiting capacity may be an instrument 
to increase ticket prices brings into play the issue of airlines market power and tacit 
collusion. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating major U.S. airlines 
for evidence of collusion by limiting their growth as part of an effort to keep ticket prices 
high.4 In this regard, Hazel (2018) underlines that capacity reductions of single airlines may 
be seen as the result of a sort of cooperative strategy leading to market power gains towards 
passengers. If so, capacity changes should exert an influence on inputs’ price transmissions 
and this idea leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2 – In period of contracting capacity, airlines achieve market power gains that allows for 
higher positive price asymmetry.  
With respect to market power, a further factor worthy of investigation is the level of 
competition. The theoretical paper by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) demonstrates that in a 
symmetric oligopoly the intensity of competition is one of the factors affecting input price 
transmission. However, this does not automatically convert into asymmetric behaviours. 
Indeed, Duso and Szücs (2017), analysing the German electricity market, find incomplete 
price transmission but not evidence of price asymmetries. In our context, despite the above 
mentioned general high level of concentration, there exist differences across European 
routes (e.g. from monopoly routes to highly competitive ones) which may create 
heterogeneity in airlines’ reaction to cost changes. In general, higher market shares may 
facilitate coordination to the detriment of competition (Borenstein, 2011a) leading to positive 
asymmetries. Price asymmetries more pronounced in low competitive markets would 
support the concerns of policy makers and consumers regarding airlines profiteering from 
fuel savings. Accordingly, our third hypothesis investigates differences in asymmetries due 
to market competition levels: 
                                               
4
 In January 2017, after a lengthy probe, the Justice Department hasn’t found enough evidence that 
merits an antitrust case against the airline industry for collusion between carriers. However, as 
reported in The Wall Street Journal (2017): “Justice Department investigators still harbor concerns 
about what they view as cozy relationships in the industry, but haven’t found conduct that clearly 
crossed the line into an antitrust violation that the department should address, people familiar with the 
matter said.” 
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H3 - Price asymmetries are influenced by the level of market competition. 
Assume now that both H2 and H3 are corroborated. In this case, higher market 
concentrations may facilitate capacity coordination. Different influences of capacity 
reductions should be observed depending on the market competition levels, with airline 
market power reaching its maximum when competition is low and capacity is reduced. If 
price asymmetries are mainly influenced by the combination of market structure and capacity 
discipline, this may pose a threat to the efficiency of the markets. Coherently, our fourth 
hypothesis is: 
H4 – The combinations of capacity discipline and market competition lead to different levels 
of price asymmetries. 
3 Data 
We use the Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) provided by OAG traffic analyser as 
principal source for the data. The data set contains monthly booking numbers and the 
associated average booked ticket fares for each airline serving each European origin and 
destination airports.5 Booked fares do not include additional government taxes, airport fees, 
airlines surcharges and ancillary revenues. We therefore consider the base fare which can 
be dynamically adjusted by airlines according to markets characteristics. We notice that 
most of the airlines implemented a fuel surcharge during the exceptional increase of oil 
prices (e.g. during the 2007-2008 crude oil price peak). These fees are carrier specific and in 
some cases were never levied (e.g. Ryanair), while in many other cases they were 
converted during low crude oil prices into other form of carrier-imposed charges (e.g. British 
Airways and Air France) or international/domestic surcharges (e.g. Lufthansa), hence losing 
any connection with their original purpose. Our analysis is not considering the evolution of 
these surcharges which, if the case, need to be considered on top of our results. Other 
variables provided by OAG comprehend the operating airline, the number and the location of 
the stops and the total trip distance. Data are collected from global distribution systems 
information (GDSs), hence bookings made directly through airlines are not included. 
However, OAG corrects the information in order to estimate the real size of the relevant 
markets. OAG schedule analyser is the source for the capacity (in terms of available seats) 
deployed by a specific airline on a specific route. To build our dataset, we matched the 
information from the two OAG databases. It is important to remark that the OAG schedule 
analyser dataset does not provide information on the capacity for indirect flights (i.e. one or 
more stops), hence our data only includes direct flights information. The sample we consider 
comprehends monthly observations from February 2010 to December 2015 of bookings at 
airline level between European airports.6 To ensure the quality of the sample, we cleaned 
the data by deleting obvious miscoding (i.e. duplicates, zero fares, bookings or distance) and 
by removing outliers (i.e. fare must be at least 25$ and the monthly number of bookings at 
least 100). Starting from the booking data, we calculate a monthly HHI index to measure the 
degree of competition for each origin and destination city pairs (i.e. considering in 
competition direct and indirect routes serving the same airport system). Unfortunately, we 
were not able to retrieve the specific fuel price for each of the airlines considered. We 
therefore approximate the fuel price by collecting the monthly average U.S. Gulf Coast 
Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price (US dollars per gallon) sourced from the US Energy 
                                               
5
 Besides the average ticket fares, the average business class fare, the average economy fare and 
their spread should be of interest. However, we were not able to retrieve such information for our 
analysis.   
6
 We follow the geographical definition of Europe provided by OAG including in the analysis both 
Western and Easter Europe countries. The list of countries considered is provided in Appendix A. 
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Information Administration. Despite airline fuel prices may differ in the absolute values, it is 
however reasonable to expect that prices variations are following the underlying jet fuel spot 
price. We acknowledge that airline practice of fuel hedging may create unpredictable 
distortions in the analysis, however airline fuel prices and hedging contracts (in Europe) are 
confidential and almost impossible to retrieve (especially if collected at monthly basis). 
Figure 1 presents the relation between jet fuel spot price (grey line) and the average ticket 
fares (black line) computed from our European sample. The two variables show a general 
strong relation. Such connection is evident at the end of 2014, when jet fuel prices 
experienced a significant fall on the back of continuing growth in global supply of crude oil. 
 
Figure 1 – Average Ticket Fare (US$) and Jet Fuel Prices (US$/Gallon) 
Air travel services, especially passenger and freight services, are known to be fairly 
seasonal with volumes rising in spring, summer, and the early fall. This variability can be 
depicted in Figure 1 by the airfares falls during the winter months and the peaks during the 
summer periods. To allow for the estimation of price asymmetries, we therefore compute the 
change of the variables with respect to the same month of the previous year. By computing 
such change (i.e. 𝑡/(𝑡 − 12)) we avoid possible biases due to the seasonal fluctuations. The 
final dataset used in the analysis is composed of 433,619 observations (decreasing to 
282,709 when considering the delta changes) which are describing ≃15,000 unique city 
pairs served by ≃125 airlines over a 59 months period. Despite the large number of 
observations, our panel data set is un-balanced (due to routes ceasing or starting during the 
period considered) and presents time gaps (mainly because of the presence of seasonal 
routes). Table 2 presents the data statistics for the variables and their changes. The last four 
columns of the table present the mean values for the sub-samples of increasing and 
decreasing fuel price and capacity.  
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Table 2 –Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample  Sub Samples  Sub Samples 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max.  Fuel 
increasing 
Fuel 
decreasing 
 Capacity 
increasing 
Capacity 
decreasing 
Fare, USD (𝑃) 142 82 25 2357  145 138  142 141 
Capacity 
(𝐶𝑎𝑝) 
7361 9452 12 149922  6580 8755  7349 7385 
Fuel, USD (𝐹) 2.57 .58 1.08 3.27  2.69 2.34  2.52 2.66 
HHI  .55 .25 .06 1  .55 .55  .54 .56 
#observations 433,619     278,029 155,590  295,105 138,514 
𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−12⁄  1.02 .41 .06 11.9  1.08 .99  1.01 1.05 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡−12⁄  1.07 .44 .01 9.99  1.07 1.08  1.27 .86 
𝐹𝑡 𝐹𝑡−12⁄  0.98 .28 .49 1.55  1.21 .79  .97 .99 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡−12⁄  1.04 .27 .17 7.16  1.07 1.01  1.07 1.01 
           
#observations 282,709     127,119 155,590  144,195 138,514 
 
Our full sample show an average increase in ticket fares (+2%) and capacity offered (+7%), 
while a decrease in jet fuel price (-2%) and competition level (HHI +4%). 56% of our 
observations have been exposed to decreasing fuel prices and 49% to capacity contractions. 
Figure 2 plots the average changes (𝑡/(𝑡 − 12)) for the variables considered. 
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Figure 2 – Average variable changes (𝒕/(𝒕 − 𝟏𝟐)) 
Jet fuel price (solid grey line) shows the highest average change during the period, with the 
average change in ticket fares (solid black line) following a similar but smoothed trend. The 
average capacity change (dash black line) shows a smaller variation remaining constantly 
above the unit for the whole period. Similarly, the average HHI change (dash grey line) 
remains constant and close to the unit for the whole period. Figure 3 shows the distribution 
of the HHI index for the routes considered in our sample. We compute the HHI index based 
on the booking number for both direct and indirect routes up to two stops which are serving 
the same airport system (i.e. we consider in competition routes serving the same OD cities). 
Over the 433,619 observations considered, around 25,000 are served as a monopoly (i.e. 
HHI=1). The average HHI is 0.55 which is slightly higher than an index generated by 2 
carriers having equal market shares on the same market. The first and third HHI quartiles 
are 0.35 and 0.72, respectively, hence describing the European market as highly 
concentrated. However, we have to consider that the data are sourced from GDSs 
information and, although adjusted by OAG, may not include the total demand levels biasing 
upwards the HHI index. To control for this possibility, we estimate our models considering 
different thresholds when defining the competition variables.  
Please cite as in: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212012217300837 
 
9 
 
 
Figure 3 – HHI index distribution 
4 Methodology 
Our panel data estimation approach is based on the mark-up theory, with airfares set as a 
function of the costs incurred and of shifter variables. Two main factors may affect the level 
of mark-up: the capacity supplied (Cannon, 2014) and the level of competition in the market 
(Koopmans and Lieshout, 2016). We therefore include two variables describing the level of 
the capacity supplied and the level of concentration on the specific route.7 The airfare (𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡) 
basic equation for each airline 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴 serving the origin destination 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 (origin-
destination airports’ pairs) in a specific time period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑎
𝐴 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑖
𝑅 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑡
𝑀 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡     (1) 
Where the variable 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 describes the capacity deployed by the airline 𝑎 on the route 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 defines the competition on the route 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error term. A set of controls for the airline 𝑋𝐴, the route 𝑋𝑅, the month 𝑋𝑀, and the year 𝑋𝑌 
are included to take into account the observations’ characteristics. Arguably, the airfares 
response to costs changes may not be immediate but distributed over time. Long and short 
term adjustments are usually estimated through the mostly used time series error correction 
models (e.g. Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003, Karagiannis et al. 2015). However, our panel 
dataset is not fitting a time-series approach since our disaggregated observations are 
spanned over a relative short period and presenting time gaps (e.g. seasonal routes, 
starting/ceasing routes, missing data, etc.). In order to estimate short and long-run equilibria 
and the adjustment speed, the observations need to be aggregated at a higher level (e.g. 
airlines level) and collected over a longer time period. However, a higher level of aggregation 
would not allow for the study of price asymmetries in different market condition (to be 
observed at OD level), which is the scope our research. We therefore pursue the estimation 
                                               
7
 With respect to possible endogeneity problems between capacity and airfare, it is important to note 
that the airlines’ scheduled are published several months prior to the flights (for example, British 
Airways releases the flights’ schedule around one year in advance). Once the capacity is set, demand 
and airfares are jointly managed through yield management systems. Indeed, Cournot models are 
often used in describing airline markets - i.e. airlines choose their quantities first (flight schedules) and 
adapt their prices to the demand. We recognise that airlines have the possibility to adjust the capacity 
accordingly with a shortage (or excess) of demand. However, these limited possibilities can be 
applied parsimoniously on a single flight basis, for example, by swapping aircraft between routes or 
simply adding or cancelling flights. Since our data are describing the aggregate capacity (and the 
average airfare) over the month, we expect these flight changes (if any) to have a negligible impact on 
our values. 
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of short term adjustments (as in Li and Stock, 2017) expressing equation (1) as a distributed 
lag function: 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑡−𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=0
+ 𝛾2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑎
𝐴 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑖
𝑅 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑡
𝑀 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑡
𝑌
+ 𝑒𝑎𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
 
Where the subscript k=0,…,K indicates the number of time lags considered. As in the 
standard distributed lag model, the parameters 𝛾1,𝑡−𝑘 represent the transmission of costs in 
a specific k-th time lag, while the sum over k of the parameters 𝛾1,𝑡−𝑘 (i.e. the cumulative 
parameter) indicates the total transmission of costs into airfares. However, the parameters 
𝛾1,𝑡−𝑘 of equation (2) are the estimated symmetric impact over the airfares (𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡) and cannot 
be used to discriminate between inputs’ prices increases and decreases. To allow for an 
asymmetric relation, we firstly modify equation (2) by considering the changes in the 
variables between months. Specifically, given the seasonality characteristics of air transport, 
we express the variables as changes between 𝑡 and the same month in the previous year 
(𝑡 − 12). When considering variable time differences, the time invariant variables are null 
and can be dropped from the equation. In our case, the control variables on the airline (𝑋𝐴), 
the route (𝑋𝑅), and the month (𝑋𝑀) can be eliminated since they do not change over time 
across our observations. Similarly, when considering the costs’ changes over time, only the 
highly volatile fuel price may have an impact on the change of the airfares charged by the 
same airline on the same route. Indeed, the other major variable components of airlines’ 
costs at route level (e.g. crew costs, taxes, catering) are almost invariant.8 Finally, with 
respect to the year dummies, the term (𝑋𝑡
𝑌 − 𝑋(𝑡−12)
𝑌 ) is not null and can be reparametrized 
as 𝑋𝑡
𝑌. Applying the logarithms to the non-dummy variables, we can rewrite equation (2) as: 
log
𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑎𝑖,(𝑡−12)
= ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=0
log
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙(𝑡−12−𝑘)
+ 𝛽2log
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,(𝑡−12)
+ 𝛽3log
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,(𝑡−12)
+ 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌
+ 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡   
or, in a more compact form, as: 
∆𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=0
∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
 
where delta (∆) stands for the logarithmic differences of each variable. The parameters of 
equation (3) evaluate the impact of independent variables changes over the change in 
airfares. In order to consider the possible asymmetric impact of fuel price changes, we 
multiply the fuel term by two dummy variables capturing the fuel price evolution: 
 
∆𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡      (4) 
                                               
8
 As discussed in section 2, the airfares considered in this analysis are not including additional 
government taxes, airport fees, airlines surcharges and ancillary revenues. Therefore, sources for 
possible additional short term variations are limited. 
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where 𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+  is equal to 1 when the fuel price increases or remains equal between time 
𝑡 − 12 − 𝑘 and 𝑡 − 𝑘 (𝑘 = 0, … , 𝐾) and zero otherwise, while 𝐹𝑡−𝑘
−  is equal to 1 when the fuel 
price decreases and zero otherwise. The two dummies are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, hence the cumulative parameters 𝛽1
𝐹+ and 𝛽1
𝐹−  in equation (3) are 
describing the asymmetric impact of fuel price change over the airfare change (𝛽2
𝐹+ when 
fuel price increases, 𝛽2
𝐹− when fuel price decreases). By testing the coefficients difference 
through a Wald test (i.e. 𝛽2
𝐹+ − 𝛽2
𝐹− = 0), we estimate if airfares are adjusted asymmetrically 
according to Hypothesis H1. In order to test our second hypothesis, we further disaggregate 
the fuel change impact by considering the case in which the capacity deployed is changing 
over the period as in equation (4): 
∆𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶+
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶+
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+
+ [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶−
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶−
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
−
+ 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡  (5) 
 
Where the dummy variables 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+  and 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
−  equal to 1 when the capacity increases/remains 
constant and when the capacity decreases, respectively. The cumulative estimated 
parameters are therefore describing the impact of a fuel price change over the airfare 
change while considering specific capacity changes: 𝛽2
𝐹+𝐶+ describes the effect under an 
increase of both capacity and fuel price, 𝛽2
𝐹−𝐶+ estimates the impact when fuel is decreasing 
but capacity is increasing, 𝛽2
𝐹+𝐶− describes the fuel change impact when fuel price is 
increasing and capacity is decreasing, while 𝛽2
𝐹−𝐶− is the estimated impact when both fuel 
price and capacity are decreasing. By testing the parameters 𝛽2
𝐹+𝐶+ − 𝛽2
𝐹+𝐶− = 0 and 
𝛽2
𝐹−𝐶+ − 𝛽2
𝐹−𝐶− = 0, we can study if airfares are adjusted differently with respect to capacity 
changes according to Hypothesis H2. Similarly, in equation (6), we analyse potential price 
asymmetries considering the level of market competition by estimating the following 
equation: 
∆𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻
+ [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡  (6) 
where 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻  and 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐿  are two dummy variables describing the competition levels of the specific 
route 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻  equal to one is describes routes with high competition, while 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐿  equal 
to one describes low competition routes. Differences between the coefficients would 
highlight heterogeneous asymmetries ascribed to market concentration levels (i.e. 
Hypothesis H3). As for equation (4), also the dummies in equation (5) and (6) are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Finally, we further disaggregate the effect by 
considering the effects of both capacity changes and competition levels: 
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∆𝑃𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = {[∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶+𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶+𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+
+ [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶−𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶−𝐻
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
− } 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻
+ {[∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶+𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶+𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+
+ [∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹+𝐶−𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡−𝑘
𝐹−𝐶−𝐿
𝐾
𝑘=0
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− ] 𝐶𝑎𝑖,𝑡
− } 𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐿
+ 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌𝑋𝑡
𝑌 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖,𝑡  (7) 
Equation (7) combines the dummies defined for equations (5) and (6). By testing the 
differences in the parameters, it is possible to evaluate the combined effects of the specific 
conditions according to Hypothesis H4.  
5 Results 
The parameters of the equations 3-7 are estimated with an OLS estimator within a robust 
framework in order to control for possible heteroscedasticity. As in Peltzman (2000), we 
included as many lags (K) as needed to describe statistically significant price adjustments 
processes. Specifically, we included 𝐾 = 1 lags because the addition of more lags resulted 
in not significant coefficients.9 All the non-dummy variables are transformed in logarithms 
and the coefficients reported can be read as elasticities. Table 2 reports the estimates of the 
equation 3, which analyses the symmetric impact of fuel price changes over airfare changes. 
The column “Coefficient” shows the estimated parameters for 𝑘 = 0, while the “Lag1 
Coefficient” column shows the parameter estimated for 𝑘 = 1. The cumulative coefficients 
reported are computed as the sum of the two coefficients and represent the total impact of 
the specific variable on the airfares. 
Table 2 – Equation 3 estimates (price symmetry) 
Variable  
Coefficient 
(k=0) 
Lag1 
Coefficient 
(k=1) 
Cumulative 
∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘 Fuel price change .275 (.011) *** .149 (.014) *** .424 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 Capacity change -.079 (.003)***   
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 HHI index change .055 (.003) ***   
𝑋2011
𝑌  Dummy year 2011 -.557 (.015) ***   
𝑋2012
𝑌  Dummy year 2012 -.501 (.011) ***   
𝑋2013
𝑌  Dummy year 2013 .379 (.010) ***   
𝑋2014
𝑌  Dummy year 2014 .423 (.010) ***   
𝑋2015
𝑌  Dummy year 2015 .392 (.006) ***   
     
Observations 243,644 
F-Statistics 18580 *** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
 
All the variables considered are statistically significant at 1% showing the expected signs. An 
increase in supplied capacity ( 
                                               
9
 We note that our distributed lag model is defined in differences, hence 𝐾 = 1 lags corresponds to 
two changes over the time: 𝑡 (𝑡 − 12)⁄  and (𝑡 − 1) (𝑡 − 13)⁄ . 
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∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡) results in lower airfares: given a downward sloping demand curve for air travel and 
an upward sloping supply curve, an increase in supplied capacity results in lower airfares 
ceteris paribus. As expected, route concentration increases are associated with an increase 
in airfares. This may confirm that highly concentrated oligopolistic markets may ease 
coordination to the detriment of competition (Borenstein, 2011a). Concerning the impact of 
fuel price changes, our model estimates that on average a 1% change in fuel prices leads to 
a cumulative 0.42% change in ticket prices. As already highlighted, the coefficient is not 
distinguishing between periods of fuel price increase or decrease not capturing potential 
asymmetric reaction of airfares to fuel price changes. Possible asymmetric reactions are 
considered in equation 4, whose estimates are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 – Equation 4 estimates (prices asymmetry) 
Variable  
Coefficient (k-
0) 
Lag 1 
Coefficient 
(k=1) 
Cumulative 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+  Fuel price increase .491 (.025) *** .293 (.029) *** .784 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
−  Fuel price decrease .114 (.012) *** -.0166 (.016) .114 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 Capacity change -.081 (.003) ***   
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 HHI index change .056 (.003) ***   
𝑋2011
𝑌  Dummy year 2011 -.229 (.007) ***   
𝑋2012
𝑌  Dummy year 2012 -.101 (.002) ***   
𝑋2013
𝑌  Dummy year 2013 .028 (.002) ***   
𝑋2014
𝑌  Dummy year 2014 -.023 (.002) ***   
𝑋2015
𝑌  Dummy year 2015 -.097 (.008) ***   
     
Observations 243,644 
F-Statistics 1542 *** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
 
Examining the impact of our variables of interest (i.e. the cumulative parameters 𝛽2
𝐹+ and 
𝛽2
𝐹−), the association between fare level changes and fuel price changes are statistically 
different from zero and concordant given the positive signs of coefficients 𝛽2
𝐹+ and 𝛽2
𝐹−.10 
However, the estimated values of the two coefficients are different: an increase of 1% in fuel 
price leads to a cumulative increase in the fare level of 0.78%, while a 1% decrease in fuel 
price leads to a notably smaller cumulative decrease (0.11%) in the airfares. A Wald test 
confirms the significant difference between the two parameters corroborating the hypothesis 
of asymmetric adjustment of airfares with respect to changes in fuel prices (Hypothesis H1). 
On average, our results show that airlines may be profiteering from fuel savings. Moreover, 
the estimates show a significant difference in adjustments process with the lagged 
coefficients only statistically significant in the case of fuel price increases. This behaviour 
may be however different with respect to the different market conditions. Table 4 presents 
the estimates of equation 5 which disaggregates the fuel changes with respect to direction of 
capacity change.  
Table 4 – Equation 5 estimates (asymmetries due to capacity supplied) 
Variable  
Coefficient 
(k=0) 
Lag 1 
Coefficient 
Cumulative 
                                               
10
 In the case of decreasing fuel price, the variable ∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 is by construction negative. Therefore, a 
positive parameter indicates that the airfare decreases concordantly with fuel price. 
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(k=1) 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
+ 
Fuel price Increase - 
Capacity Increase 
.600 (.034) *** .174 (.036) *** .774 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
+ 
Fuel price Decrease – 
Capacity Increase 
.119 (.015) *** -.012 (.019) .119 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
− 
Fuel price Increase - 
Capacity Decrease 
.390 (.034) *** .412 (.037) *** .802 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
− 
Fuel price Decrease – 
Capacity Decrease 
.107 (.016) *** -.019 (.019) .107 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 Capacity change -.074 (.003) ***   
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 HHI index change .056 (.003) ***   
𝑋2011
𝑌  Dummy year 2011 -.223 (.007) ***   
𝑋2012
𝑌  Dummy year 2012 -.100 (.002) ***   
𝑋2013
𝑌  Dummy year 2013 .028 (.002) ***   
𝑋2014
𝑌  Dummy year 2014 -.024 (.002) ***   
𝑋2015
𝑌  Dummy year 2015 -.096 (.008) ***   
     
Observations 243,644 
F-Statistics 1137 *** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
 
The coefficients associated with capacity, HHI and year dummies are robust and similar to 
the results reported in Table 2 and 3, confirming as well the rocket and feather behaviour 
(positive asymmetry). Moreover, in periods of capacity contractions (𝐶−) we observe that, 
ceteris paribus, fuel price increases are passed to the passengers at a higher degree than in 
periods of capacity increases (𝐶+). Indeed, an increase of 1% of fuel prices during capacity 
decreases leads to a cumulative increase of 0.80% of ticket prices, while, the cumulative 
increase associated to fuel price and capacity increases is significantly lower and equal 
0.77%. In case of fuel price decreasing, results suggest a similar but smoothed behaviour 
with airlines passing lower savings in case of capacity contractions (0.11%) with respect to 
periods of capacity increases (0.12%). However, in this case the two coefficients are not 
significantly different. The result may suggest that capacity contractions increase airlines 
market power only in period of fuel price growth. Nevertheless, this is sufficient to 
corroborate the hypothesis of higher positive price asymmetry (H2). 
The level of competition may be a factor affecting price transmission as well as price 
asymmetry. In this regard, Table 5 presents the results when estimating the asymmetries 
considering different competition levels (equation 6). More precisely, the price changes are 
estimated for routes showing high and low degrees of competition (i.e. high competition, 
𝐻𝐻 = 1 if 𝐻𝐻𝐼 < 0.5). 
 
Table 5 – Equation 6 estimates (asymmetries due to competition levels) 
Variable  
Coefficient 
(k=0) 
Lag 1 
Coefficient 
(k=1) 
Cumulative 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price Increase – 
High Competition 
.500 (.032) *** .265 (.0.35) *** .765 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price Decrease – 
High Competition 
.146 (.015) *** -.043 (.018) .146 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐻𝐿 Fuel price Increase - .483 (.036) *** .319 (.037) *** .802 
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Low Competition 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐻𝐿 
Fuel price Decrease – 
Low Competition 
.079 (.016) *** -.011 (.019) .079 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 Capacity change -.079 (.002) ***   
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 HHI index change .054 (.003) ***   
𝑋2011
𝑌  Dummy year 2011 -.229 (.007) ***   
𝑋2012
𝑌  Dummy year 2012 -.100 (.002) ***   
𝑋2013
𝑌  Dummy year 2013 .028 (.002) ***   
𝑋2014
𝑌  Dummy year 2014 -.024 (.003) ***   
𝑋2015
𝑌  Dummy year 2015 -.097 (.008) ***   
     
Observations 243,644 
F-Statistics 1136 *** 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
 
When analysing the parameters of interest, table 5 confirms the asymmetric pricing 
behaviour. Moreover, we observe that in periods of fuel price increase (𝐹+) airfares have a 
statistical significant higher cumulative increase in low competition markets (0.80%) 
compared to the high competitive ones (0.77%). Similarly, in period of fuel price decrease 
(𝐹−), the estimates suggest that in low competition markets airlines are passing a slightly 
lower level of savings compared to the high competitive ones (0.14%, 0.08%). We check the 
robustness of these results by changing thresholds defining the low and high competition 
dummies (i.e. 𝐻𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻). To this extent, figures 4a-4b show the different estimated 
parameters (y – axis) with respect to different HHI threshold defining the low and high 
competition dummies (x – axis) (Table 5 uses the 0.5 thresholds). Figure 4a presents the 
results for fuel price increase parameters, while figure 4b the estimates for the decreasing 
period. 
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Figure 4a – Cumulative impacts of fuel price increasing parameters with respect to 
different HHI thresholds 
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Figure 4b – Cumulative impacts of fuel price decreasing parameters with respect to 
different HHI thresholds 
 
Figure 4a shows that, in case of fuel price increase, the spread between the parameters 
increases accordingly with the increase in the HHI threshold (Wald tests on the parameters’ 
differences show statistically significance). Indeed, when increasing the threshold from 0.5 to 
0.9 (i.e. 𝐻𝐻 = 1 when 𝐻𝐻𝐼 < 0.9) the cumulative parameter associated to low competition 
moves from 0.80 to 0.84. In other words, moving towards a monopolistic situation the airlines 
increase the pass-through of costs taking advantage of their increasing market power. 
Similar results are obtained in the case of fuel price decrease (Figure 4b), where the 
cumulative parameters diverge for high HHI thresholds.11 Our hypothesis H3 is confirmed: 
price asymmetries differ with respect to competition levels.  
The last step of our analysis is to estimate the combined effect of capacity changes and 
competitive levels. Table 6 reports the estimates of equation 7. The model further 
disaggregates the fuel price variable by considering the combined effect of capacity changes 
and competition levels (i.e. 𝐻𝐻 = 1 when 𝐻𝐻𝐼 < 0.5). 
Table 6 – Equation 7 estimates (asymmetries due to capacity supplied and competition 
levels) 
Variable  
Coefficient 
(k=0) 
Lag 1 
Coefficient 
Cumulative 
                                               
11
 We note that for low levels of HHI thresholds (e.g. HHI=0.3) the lines are crossing in graph 4a 
showing a counter intuitive behaviour. This situation may be due to discrimination problems mainly 
caused by the low number of observations below the 0.3 threshold (only 44,000). 
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(k=1) 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
+𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price 
Increase - 
Capacity Increase 
– High 
Competition 
.592 (.045) *** .169 (.046) *** .761 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
+𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price 
Decrease – 
Capacity Increase 
- High Competition 
.153 (.020) *** -.046 (.023) .153 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
−𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price 
Increase - 
Capacity 
Decrease- High 
Competition 
.411 (.047) *** .368 (.048) *** .779 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
−𝐻𝐻 
Fuel price 
Decrease – 
Capacity 
Decrease- High 
Competition 
.137 (.022) *** -.038 (.024) .137 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
+𝐻𝐿 
Fuel price 
Increase - 
Capacity Increase 
– Low Competition 
.610 (.052) *** .177 (.052) *** .787 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
+𝐻𝐿 
Fuel price 
Decrease – 
Capacity Increase 
- Low Competition 
.080 (.023) *** .025 (.0.25) .080 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑡
−𝐻𝐿 
Fuel price 
Increase - 
Capacity Decrease 
- Low Competition 
.369 (.049) *** .454 (.050) *** .823 
(∆𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡−𝑘)𝐹𝑡−𝑘
− 𝐶𝑡
−𝐻𝐿 
Fuel price 
Decrease – 
Capacity 
Decrease- Low 
Competition 
.076 (.023) *** -.001 (.025) .076 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 Capacity change -.074 (.003) ***   
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 HHI index change .054 (.003) ***   
𝑋2011
𝑌  Dummy year 2011 -.230 (.007) ***   
𝑋2012
𝑌  Dummy year 2012 -.100 (.002) ***   
𝑋2013
𝑌  Dummy year 2013 .028 (.002) ***   
𝑋2014
𝑌  Dummy year 2014 -.024 (.002) ***   
𝑋2015
𝑌  Dummy year 2015 -.097 (.008) ***   
     
Observations 243,644 
F-Statistics 746 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
 
Results are in line with previous estimations, showing positive asymmetry with respect to 
fuel price changes. Generally, fuel price increases are passed at a higher degree in case of 
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contraction in capacity and low competition markets (a cumulative 0.823), while savings are 
passed at a higher degree in situation of high competition and capacity increase (a 
cumulative 0.153). These behaviours can be depicted when analysing the evolution of the 
parameters with respect to different competition levels. We estimate equation 7 using 
different thresholds for the dummy variables 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐿. Results are presented in figures 5a 
(increasing fuel price periods) and 5b (decreasing fuel price periods). 
 
Figure 5a – Estimated cumulative parameters during increasing fuel price periods 
with respect to different HHI thresholds. 
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Figure 5b – Estimated cumulative parameters during decreasing fuel price periods 
with respect to different HHI thresholds. 
 
Figure 5a shows that airlines’ market power reaches its maximum in situation of capacity 
reduction and low competition (red line). This effect increases with the increase of the HHI 
threshold. On the opposite, the lowest market power is produced by combining capacity 
increase and high competition (green line), with the cumulative parameters remaining similar 
despite the HHI threshold. When combining capacity increase (decrease) with low (high) 
competition, the cumulative parameters are the results of conflicting effects. The estimations 
show similar fuel price transmissions (blue and yellow lines) lying in between the two others 
cases. Summarising, during periods of fuel price increases, the combination of capacity 
change and competition levels may result in different price transmissions (H4). Figure 5b 
shows different results. Indeed, in cases of fuel price reduction, the differences in price 
transmission ascribable to capacity states are small (with the only exceptions of high HHI 
thresholds coefficients in low competitive markets). Generally, the reduced importance of 
capacity in case of fuel price reduction is in line with the result obtained from Equation 5. 
This result may be interpreted as a signal of the fact that, when pressure on margins relaxes 
and there is room for increasing profits, capacity coordination among airlines is more difficult 
(i.e. feasible only in very highly concentrated market).12 
The estimates of equations (4)-(7) show the price elasticities and not the pass-through level 
itself. Indeed, it is not straightforward to move from the estimated elasticities to the 
                                               
12
 As in Figures 4a, also in Figures 5a the coefficients are misbehaving for small HHI thresholds 
possibly due to discrimination problems. With respect to Figure 5b, the coefficients for F-C-Hl at 
HHI=.9 were not significant and therefore the cumulative value is not plotted.     
Please cite as in: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212012217300837 
 
21 
 
corresponding pass-through value since fuel cost is only one of the components of the 
airfare. However, some considerations may help in this regard. For example, Stalnaker et al. 
(2016) show that fuel expenses range between the 17% and 38% of passenger revenues. 
Based on such considerations, on average we can expect that elasticities between 0.2 and 
0.4 may be interpreted as a pass-through rate of ≃100%. Our base estimates (i.e. Table 3), 
assuming the 0.4 elasticity, show that airlines pass cost increases more than proportionally 
(on average ≃190% of fuel increases), while retaining most of the fuel savings passing only 
≃30% of them. However, the pass-through rate may change significantly with respect to 
different market conditions. Indeed, when fuel price increase, the estimated pass-through 
rate ranges from ≃190% in case of capacity increasing and high competition markets to a 
≃205% in case of capacity decreasing and low competition markets. In case of fuel price 
decrease, the estimated pass-through of savings ranges from a ≃20% in case of capacity 
contracting and low competition to 40% when capacity is growing in high competitive 
markets (cumulative estimates of Table 6). Generally, our results show that airlines tend to 
act opportunistically either by appropriating a significant part of fuel savings or by increasing 
their fares more than proportionally in case of fuel price rise. However, we note that a correct 
estimation of the pass-through rate should consider a more accurate computation of fuel 
expenses. These expenses may vary between airlines, for example on the basis of fuel 
purchase agreements. Moreover, airlines locked into hedge contracts can only partially (if 
not at all) benefit from potential saving coming from a reduction in fuel prices. However, the 
effects of fuel hedging are unpredictable given that information on contracts are not publicly 
available. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the dynamics of fuel price change on European airfares taking into 
account the effect of supplied capacity and the competitive market structure. We apply a 
distributed lag model describing European airlines/routes level data over the period 2010-
2015. 
Our results confirm the recent press argument that airlines adjust airfares asymmetrically. 
On average, the increase of fares is proportionally higher during periods of fuel prices 
increase than their decrease during fuel prices’ contractions following a “rocket and feather” 
dynamic. Furthermore, our estimates show that positive adjustments are quicker than the 
negative ones. We extend previous literature by looking at the influence on asymmetry rate 
exerted by capacity adjustments and competitive pressure. Our results suggest that 
reductions in capacity can increase airlines’ market power and, in turns, the asymmetric 
pricing behaviour. The role played by capacity reduction is emphasized in low competitive 
environments during periods of fuel price increases. This may indicate that airlines choices 
are driven by a sort of cooperative implementation of capacity discipline when coordination is 
easier (i.e. when competitive pressure is lower). However, the influence of capacity reduction 
is dampened by route competition and tends to disappear when fuel price decreases. These 
results may be of interest for the regulatory authorities since we show that airline capability 
of profiteering on fuel price changes, to the detriment of passengers, is the combined result 
of capacity change and high concentration at the route level.  
The paper has some limitations. Due to the nature of our data (large number of 
observations, short periods and gaps in the temporal coverage) we do not apply a time-
series approach hence not separating the effects of short and long-time fare adjustments. 
Moreover, our fuel price variable is considering the market jet fuel spot price which may be 
not relevant in case of airlines hedging fuel prices. Our estimates may only be analyzed as 
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general trend and may result being biased for specific airline cases. We therefore invite 
further research inquiry in this area. 
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Appendix A – Countries included in the analysis 
Frequencies between origin and destination vary due to data cleaning. 
Origin Frequency Destination Frequency 
Albania 900 Albania 931 
Armenia 1,146 Armenia 1,221 
Austria 11,434 Austria 11,864 
Azerbaijan 1,740 Azerbaijan 1,948 
Belarus 2,251 Belarus 2,276 
Belgium 6,256 Belgium 6,432 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 677 Bosnia and Herzegovina 676 
Bulgaria 2,966 Bulgaria 2,877 
Croatia 4,346 Croatia 4,232 
Cyprus 2,495 Cyprus 2,486 
Czech Republic 6,024 Czech Republic 6,181 
Denmark 8,614 Denmark 8,670 
Estonia 1,541 Estonia 1,557 
Faroe Islands 91 Faroe Islands 107 
Finland 6,500 Finland 6,478 
France 35,526 France 35,033 
Georgia 1,605 Georgia 1,582 
Germany 51,139 Germany 52,336 
Gibraltar 71 Gibraltar 71 
Greece 16,372 Greece 15,409 
Hungary 2,774 Hungary 2,857 
Iceland 1,060 Iceland 1,081 
Ireland Republic of 5,081 Ireland Republic of 5,438 
Italy 40,316 Italy 39,774 
Latvia 3,293 Latvia 3,279 
Lithuania 1,224 Lithuania 1,208 
Luxembourg 1,619 Luxembourg 1,822 
Macedonia Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
450 
Macedonia Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
450 
Malta 2,375 Malta 2,370 
Moldova Republic of 1,247 Moldova Republic of 1,312 
Montenegro 1,395 Montenegro 1,384 
Netherlands 8,979 Netherlands 9,142 
Norway 12,237 Norway 12,155 
Poland 7,493 Poland 7,547 
Portugal 10,044 Portugal 9,869 
Romania 5,578 Romania 5,605 
Russian Federation 29,334 Russian Federation 29,380 
Serbia 3,430 Serbia 3,364 
Slovakia 394 Slovakia 401 
Slovenia 1,549 Slovenia 1,561 
Spain 46,729 Spain 45,489 
Sweden 9,933 Sweden 10,082 
Switzerland 13,394 Switzerland 13,775 
Turkey 13,031 Turkey 12,457 
Ukraine 9,141 Ukraine 9,040 
United Kingdom 39,825 United Kingdom 40,410 
 
 
